<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Bargaining on Keisuke Hattori</title><link>https://httrksk.github.io/tags/bargaining/</link><description>Recent content in Bargaining on Keisuke Hattori</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:20:00 +0900</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://httrksk.github.io/tags/bargaining/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Why the Most Profitable Cartel May Not Last</title><link>https://httrksk.github.io/post/20261023/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:20:00 +0900</pubDate><guid>https://httrksk.github.io/post/20261023/</guid><description>&lt;h4 id="background">Background&lt;/h4>
&lt;p>When firms collude to avoid price competition, it seems natural for them to choose the arrangement that produces the largest combined profit. If one firm can produce more cheaply than another, letting it supply the market and share some of the proceeds with its rival would achieve that goal. Yet this paper shows theoretically that &lt;strong>a less profitable arrangement can be the only one the firms can sustain&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>