Who Creates Demand? Retail Entry and the Design of Distribution Networks

2026/11/15 5 min read

Background

Manufacturers and retailers both help create demand for a product. For household appliances, manufacturers advertise product benefits, while retailers explain features and offer demonstrations that encourage consumers to buy. Likewise, demand for the iPhone is supported by advertising from both Apple and mobile carriers. This paper studies markets in which manufacturers and retailers both invest in demand creation. It asks how retail entry changes the division of that investment and firms’ profits, and what distribution network the manufacturer prefers.

The central feature of the model is that each firm bears its own investment costs, while the benefits also reach other firms. Manufacturer advertising helps retailers sell, and a customer who receives advice at one store may buy elsewhere. In the baseline, every firm’s investment raises demand for the common product and benefits all retailers.

The division of demand creation emerges from firms’ independent investment choices. Manufacturers and retailers share an interest in attracting buyers, but retailers compete for the resulting sales. As the network grows, who takes on more of the task? The paper shows theoretically that the resulting changes can make entry reduce the manufacturer’s profit or increase incumbent retailers’ profits. It also examines how these incentives shape the manufacturer’s choice of network size.

What the paper does

The model has one manufacturer supplying the same product to several retailers. The manufacturer and each retailer invest in demand creation. In the baseline, creating a given increase in demand costs the same for every firm. The analysis then allows investment costs to differ between the manufacturer and retailers.

First, the firms choose their investments simultaneously. The manufacturer then sets a common wholesale price, and retailers compete by choosing sales quantities. When deciding how much to invest, retailers anticipate that some of the benefits will go to other stores and that the manufacturer may subsequently raise the wholesale price.

The analysis first holds retailer numbers fixed and studies investment, prices, sales, and profits. It then lets the manufacturer choose the number of retailers that maximizes its profit, before firms invest. Adding a retailer entails no cost, and there are no access fees. The question is whether the manufacturer nevertheless wants to limit its network, and how its decision changes when either it or its retailers can create demand more cheaply.

What it finds

First, adding retailers can reduce the manufacturer’s profit even as its wholesale price and sales rise.

In the baseline, entry reduces investment by each retailer and increases investment by the manufacturer. Each retailer captures a smaller share of the returns to creating demand and therefore invests less. The manufacturer earns revenue from sales through every retailer, so a larger network encourages it to invest more. Total investment in demand creation increases, raising both the wholesale price and total sales.

Once the network is sufficiently large, the decline in investment by existing retailers outweighs the entrant’s contribution. Retailers’ combined investment then falls, and demand creation increasingly depends on the manufacturer. When investment is sufficiently effective, the loss of retailer contributions outweighs the sales gain from stronger competition. The manufacturer then prefers a finite network even though adding retailers is costless.

Second, incumbent retailers can earn more despite stronger competition and a higher wholesale price.

At relatively small network sizes, entry increases manufacturer investment and adds the entrant’s contribution, while incumbents reduce their own investment. Existing retailers benefit from greater demand while spending less on advertising and product information. When these effects are strong enough, their profits rise despite tougher competition and higher purchasing costs.

This result is not confined to entry from one retailer to two. Each incumbent can also cut its investment while the entrant raises retailers’ combined contribution. The key is to distinguish how much demand the network creates from how much each retailer pays to create it.

Third, cheaper demand creation by retailers can shrink the distribution network and leave consumers worse off.

At a fixed network size, lower investment costs for either the manufacturer or retailers increase demand creation and sales, benefiting consumers. Once the manufacturer can adjust retailer numbers, however, it matters whose costs fall.

Within the region where the preferred network is finite, cheaper manufacturer investment favors expansion. Cheaper retailer investment instead favors contraction: preserving retailers’ contributions becomes more valuable, so the manufacturer limits competition to encourage investment by each store. This contraction can outweigh the direct benefit of cheaper investment, reducing total sales and consumer surplus.

Even when consumers lose, total surplus can rise if the increase in firms’ combined profits more than offsets that loss. The effects on consumers and on society as a whole need not coincide.

Why it matters

Manufacturers should consider network size and the division of demand creation together. If retailers cut back on advertising and product information, the manufacturer bears a greater investment burden. Higher sales may then come with lower profit.

The results also matter for competition policy. Manufacturer support for retailers need not benefit consumers once network decisions adjust. For example, reimbursing some of retailers’ promotional costs encourages investment, but can also lead the manufacturer to choose fewer retailers. Consumers may then lose from weaker competition. Support measures should therefore be assessed together with their effects on the distribution network.

Limits on retailer numbers weaken competition, but can also encourage each store to advertise and explain products to customers. Retailer numbers alone are therefore an incomplete guide to the merits of a distribution network. Understanding who creates demand and who pays for it helps assess the consequences for both firms and consumers.

This research was supported by a research grant from the Kampo Foundation for fiscal year 2026 and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24K04912.


About the paper

  • Title: Who Creates Demand? Retail Entry and Distribution Networks
  • Authors: Keisuke Hattori and Takeshi Yoshikawa
  • Year: 2026
  • Publication status: Working paper available on EconStor
  • Full paper: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/344260