Who Should Lead the Team?
Background
In many workplaces, a leader takes the initiative, and other team members respond by working harder. One important role of leadership is to motivate others through one’s own actions, not just through instructions. But who should be chosen to lead a team? And how can management identify the right person and give them an incentive to take on that role?
This paper develops a theoretical explanation of how synergy among team members affects the benefits of leadership, who makes an effective leader, and how that leader can be selected.
What the paper does
We consider a two-person team working on a joint project. Its output depends not only on each person’s effort but also on the synergy created when their efforts work together. The stronger this synergy, the more valuable one member’s effort becomes when the other member works harder.
The members differ in the opportunity cost of contributing to the project. One person may have other responsibilities or valuable work to pursue, making time spent on this team particularly costly. Another may be in a position to concentrate more fully on the project and therefore face a lower opportunity cost.
We first compare a horizontal team, where neither person is designated as the leader, with a team where one person commits to an effort level before the other acts. This allows us to examine how leadership affects team performance. We then ask which member should lead and how management can design compensation to select that person, even when the members know each other’s opportunity costs but management does not.
What it finds
First, when team members’ efforts generate synergy, leadership improves team performance.
With synergy, one member’s greater effort makes it more attractive for the other to work harder as well. A leader who commits to working hard can therefore encourage the follower to increase their effort. By anticipating that response, the leader helps the team achieve more than it would without a designated leader. Without synergy, however, this advantage of leadership disappears.
Second, the person with the higher opportunity cost of working on the project should be appointed as the leader.
At first, it might seem better to choose someone who has less to sacrifice by committing time and effort to the team. But placing the lower-opportunity-cost member in the follower’s role means that this person responds more strongly to the leader’s actions, reinforcing the team’s synergy. Team output is greatest when the member who can respond more readily to the leader is placed in the follower’s position. Put differently, it can be advantageous for the follower to be the person best able to concentrate on the project. The greater the difference in members’ opportunity costs, the more the choice of leader matters.
Third, selecting a desirable leader requires an additional allowance for taking on the leadership role.
A leader commits to greater effort first, thereby encouraging the follower to work harder. But without extra compensation, each member would rather be the follower, who can respond after observing the leader’s decision and avoid the burden of taking the initiative. Both members can benefit from working in a team with a leader, yet neither wants to take that role. An appropriate redistribution of compensation between the two positions can overcome this problem.
Fourth, management can design a mechanism to select the right leader even without knowing each member’s opportunity cost.
One possibility is to ask each member how much additional compensation they would require to become the leader. In the mechanism studied in the paper, the member with the higher opportunity cost is willing to accept the leadership role for a smaller allowance. This makes it possible to identify the desirable leader. Stronger synergy also calls for a larger leadership allowance, because taking the initiative becomes more demanding when the follower responds more strongly to the leader’s effort.
Fifth, letting members choose their own roles does not necessarily produce the most effective team structure.
If the members independently decide whether to act first or wait, each may hope that the other will volunteer to lead. Although an equilibrium with the desirable leader exists, the analysis also identifies a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which less desirable team arrangements are more likely. The division of roles that best serves the team need not emerge from the members’ voluntary choices.
Taken together, effective leadership depends not only on individual qualities, but also on how team members’ efforts interact and on who is appointed to lead.
Why it matters
Choosing a leader requires more than assessing candidates’ abilities or willingness to work hard. Management should also consider how much additional effort each candidate’s actions would encourage from the other team members. Where people’s contributions are closely interconnected, the allocation of leadership roles can have a substantial effect on performance.
A leadership allowance is not merely a reward for status. It can compensate for the burden of acting first and help bring about a division of roles that benefits the team. When synergy is stronger, a larger pay difference between leader and follower may therefore be justified.
This theoretical study identifies the conditions under which these mechanisms operate. The challenge is not simply to find an outstanding individual, but to choose a leader in light of the team’s interactions and to create incentives for that person to accept the role.
This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 16K13366.
About the paper
- Title: Effective Leadership Selection in Complementary Teams
- Authors: Keisuke Hattori and Mai Yamada
- Year: 2020
- Journal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 176, 620–639
- Full paper: https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0037