Should Teams Mix People of Different Skill Levels?
Background
When putting together a team, is it better to pair a highly skilled employee with someone less experienced, or to bring together people with similar abilities? And does appointing a leader necessarily improve the team’s performance?
To answer these questions, we need to consider more than what employees can accomplish today. Working in a particular team can also change their incentives to develop their skills and motivation for future work. This paper examines theoretically why the team structure that performs best in the short run need not be the best one in the long run.
Knowing that a capable colleague will take care of the work can make life easier, but it might also weaken one’s incentive to improve. Working with someone of similar ability, by contrast, may encourage both members to develop their skills. How do the choice of teammates and the presence of a leader shape these incentives?
What the paper does
We consider an organization that divides its employees into two-person teams working together repeatedly. Each member allocates a limited amount of time between contributing to the team project and leisure. Team output depends on how much time each person contributes and on their skill or motivation. Members receive rewards based on the team’s performance.
We allow skills and motivation to change gradually over time. If becoming more skilled would improve a member’s own payoff, that member has an incentive to develop their skills. If it would instead reduce their payoff, the incentive can run in the opposite direction. We examine how these incentives affect team productivity over time.
We compare two ways of forming teams: heterogeneous pairing, which combines members with different skill levels, and homogeneous pairing, which brings together members of similar ability. We also compare horizontal teams, where both members choose their contributions simultaneously and neither is designated as leader, with vertical teams, where a leader commits to a contribution first and a follower responds after observing it.
What it finds
First, in teams without a leader, members may have incentives to reduce their own skills or motivation.
Because team performance is rewarded collectively, a member may be able to rely on a colleague to do more of the work. Becoming more skilled can induce that colleague to contribute less. As a result, improving one’s ability may actually leave the individual worse off. In particular, when members have similar skill levels and place relatively little value on team-performance rewards, both may have incentives to let their skills or motivation decline.
Second, mixing people with different skill levels can improve short-run performance, yet pairing people of similar ability may be better in the long run.
When existing skills are taken as given, heterogeneous pairing produces at least as much total output as homogeneous pairing. But a large skill gap can lead the more capable member to carry most of the work, while the less capable member has little incentive to contribute or improve. Under certain conditions, homogeneous pairing instead encourages both members to keep developing their skills. A team arrangement that initially performs less well can therefore become the more productive one over time.
Third, leadership can improve long-run productivity even when it does not increase immediate team output.
In this model, a leader chooses their contribution before the follower does. This allows the leader to rely strategically on the follower’s effort, so a team with a leader produces no more—and sometimes less—in the short run than a team without one. Yet the leader does not benefit from becoming less skilled simply to induce a stronger response from the follower. Appointing a leader can therefore prevent a situation in which both members continually lose skills or motivation. An organizational structure that sacrifices some immediate output can sometimes perform better in the long run.
Fourth, when a team combines members of different abilities, appointing the less skilled member as leader produces at least as much short-run output as the reverse assignment.
Here, leadership means committing to an action first while anticipating the other member’s response. With the more skilled person in the follower’s role, that person can take on a larger share of the work, raising the team’s output. The result may seem to run against the intuition that the strongest performer should always lead. What matters is who acts first and who is positioned to respond, rather than simply who has the highest skill level.
Fifth, the best team composition and leadership structure depend on how strongly members value rewards tied to team performance.
When members place substantial weight on team-performance rewards, pairing people of similar ability can encourage everyone to improve their skills and may be preferable in the long run. In this case, a horizontal team without a designated leader also performs better. When members place less weight on those rewards, heterogeneous pairing can be advantageous in both the short and long run, while leadership may protect the team against a persistent decline in skills and motivation.
Taken together, team composition and leadership should be evaluated not only by what members produce today, but also by how their roles affect their incentives to develop skills and motivation for the future.
Why it matters
If organizations form teams solely on the basis of current productivity, they may overlook arrangements that lead to better performance over time. It is important to weigh the immediate benefits of combining employees with different abilities against the possibility that similarly skilled colleagues encourage one another to grow.
The value of leadership should not be judged only by its immediate effect on output, either. Even if a leader does not directly encourage greater effort, the assignment of leadership roles may help prevent a long-term decline in members’ skills or motivation. Conversely, where members already have strong incentives to improve, appointing a leader may reduce short-run performance without offering the same long-term advantage.
This theoretical study identifies the conditions under which these mechanisms arise. The central question is not only how to combine the abilities employees currently possess, but also how those combinations shape the abilities they will develop.
About the paper
- Title: Skill Diversity and Leadership in Team Production
- Authors: Keisuke Hattori and Mai Yamada
- Year: 2018
- Journal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 174, 351–374
- Full paper: https://doi.org/10.1628/093245617X14996661407767